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The Procedural Aspects of the Application of Competition Law
Although substantive competition law has been largely “Europeanized”, procedural 
law comes, for the most part, under the autonomy of the Member States and, for a long 
time, thinking on the procedural aspects of competition law’s application had not been 
in the focus of the European scholarship. Nonetheless, recently, “procedure” became 
one of the most topical issues of European competition law and came to the fore of the 
scholarly discourse. This edited volume addresses the above subject’s pan-European 
framework and its Central European perspectives with the purpose of channelling 
the region’s experiences into the European discourse. The book’s first part (Section 1) 
examines the general issues of the procedural aspects of competition law’s application, 
while Sections 2 and 3 analyse the administrative competition procedure (and judicial 
review) and the legal consequences of breaching competition rules in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
About the editor
Dr. Csongor István Nagy Ph.D., LL.M., S.J.D, dr. juris is an associate professor in 
Hungary, the leader of the Federal Markets “Momentum” Research Group at the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the head of the Department of Private International 
Law at the University of Szeged and an attorney-at-law admitted to the Budapest 
Bar. Furthermore, he is visiting professor at the Central European University, at the 




The Procedural Aspects of the Application of 
Competition Law
European Frameworks – Central European Perspectives
Edited by Csongor István Nagy
Europa Law Publishing is a publishing 
company specializing in European Union law, 
international trade law, public international 
law, environmental law and comparative 
national law.
For further information please contact 
Europa Law Publishing via email: info@
europalawpublishing.com or visit our website 
at: www.europalawpublishing.com.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication 
may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form 
or by any means, or stored in any retrieval 
system of any nature, without the written 
permission of the publisher. Application 
for permission for use of copyright material 
shall be made to the publishers. Full 
acknowledgement of author, publisher and 
source must be given.
Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze 
uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikel 16h 
t/m 16m Auteurswet 1912 juncto het Besluit 
van 27 november 2002, Stb. 575, dient men de 
daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen 
te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht 
(Postbus 3060, 2130 KB Hoofddorp). 
Voor het overnemen van (een) gedeelte(n) 
uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers 
en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16 
Auteurswet 1912) dient men zich tot de 
uitgever te wenden.
© Europa Law Publishing, the authors 
severally, 2016
Typeset in Scala and Scala Sans, Graphic 





This book was published with the generous 
support of the International Visegrad Fund.
ix
contents
chapter 6  Private Antitrust Enforcement and Private International 
Law. Recent Developments
Mihail	Danov







	 3.2	 Article	7(2)	and	EU	competition	law	damages	actions	 117
	 3.3	 Article	8(1)	and	EU	competition	law	damages	actions	 118
	 3.4	 Article	8(2)	and	EU	competition	law	damages	actions	 121
	 3.5	 Article	25	and	EU	competition	law	damages	actions	 122
	 4	 Applicable	laws–	Lex Fori and	Lex Causae 124
	 5	 	Centralising	litigation:	dealing	with	parallel	cross-border	EU	
antitrust	proceedings	 128
	 6	 Concluding	remarks	 131
chapter 7  Criminal Antitrust Enforcement and Procedural 
Fairness. A Critical Analysis
Peter	Whelan







	 4.1	 Exchange	of	information	 141
	 4.2	 Double	jeopardy	 145
	 4.3	 Concurrent	proceedings	 147
	 5	 Conclusions	 149
chapter 8  Administrative (Competition) Procedure and Judicial 
Review in Serbia
Dragan	Gajin	&	Zoltan	Vig
	 1	 The	preconditions	of	launching	a	competition	proceeding	 156




Administrative (Competition) Procedure and Judicial Review in Serbia
Dragan Gajin & Zoltan Vig
156
the procedural aspects of the application of competition law
 1 The preconditions of launching a competition proceeding
The Serbian competition authority (the Commission for 
Protection of Competition) has significant discretion when it comes to launch-
ing antitrust investigations. The legislation provides that the Commission 
shall launch an investigation regarding restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominance when it reasonably assumes that an infringement of competition 
occurred.1 The Commission may open an investigation either upon initiative of 
an interested party or based on information it obtained from another source.2
Related to interested parties, it should be emphasized that (i) interested 
parties do not have the right to formally request an opening of an investigation, 
but may only turn to the Commission with an initiative that an investigation be 
opened; (ii) the Commission does not have the obligation to launch an investiga-
tion based on an initiative submitted by a third party – the Commission’s duty is 
limited to notifying the submitter about the outcome of the initiative within 15 
days of the receipt of the initiative.3
Therefore, the standard for opening an investigation is a “reasonable 
assumption” that an infringement of competition occurred, and it is upon the 
Commission to interpret whether this standard has been met. Due to the vague-
ness of this standard, the Commission has significant leeway when it comes to 
choosing the matters in which it will open an investigation – and in this respect, 
it is possible that the Commission also weighs whether it would be in the public 
interest to start a case.
 2 Relationship between EU and national law
First of all, it should be mentioned, that Serbia has signed the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with the EU in 20084 (hereinafter ‘SAA’). The SAA 
entered into force on September 1, 2013, following ratification by Serbia, the 
EU, and all of the EU Member States. This Agreement is significant for the 
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must harmonize its laws (including those in the field of competition) with the 
EU.6 Second, the SAA contains substantive competition law provisions, thus 
Article 73.1 (i) and (ii) of the SAA reads as follows:
The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, 
insofar as they may affect trade between the Community and Serbia:
(i) all Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition;
(ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories 
of the Community or Serbia as a whole or in a substantial part thereof.
Further, pursuant to Article 73.2 of the SAA “any practices contrary to this 
Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the application of 
the competition rules applicable in the Community, in particular from Articles 
[101, 102, 106 and 107 TFEU]7 and interpretative instruments adopted by the 
Community institutions”.
The effect of Article 73 of the SAA has been disputed between legal schol-
ars.8 In practice, the Serbian Commission often relies on the EU legislation 
and case law cited by the parties in order to interpret general provisions of the 
Serbian law.
 3  The National Competition Authority’s (NCA) information-
gathering tools
In some European countries, like Hungary, informants’ awards 
have been introduced for encouraging informants to share their information 
with the NCA, however, this is not available in Serbia.
However, there are other ways of acquiring information, like leniency. Under 
certain conditions, a party to a restrictive agreement may be afforded immunity 
from a fine or qualify for a reduction of a fine. The leniency regime is available 
Marković-Bajalović,	Preti li jasna i neposredna opasnost od novog Zakona o zaštiti konkurencije? [Is there a 
Clear and Present Danger from the New Law on Protection of Competition?]	58(1)	Anali	Pravnog	fakulteta	u	
Beogradu	304	(2010);	Boris	Begović,	Vladimir	Pavić,	Jasna i neposredna opasnost II: čas anatomije [Clear 
and Present Danger II: A Class of Anatomy]	58(2)	Anali	Pravnog	fakulteta	u	Beogradu	338	(2010).	See 
also	Siniša	Rodin,	Requirements of EU Membership and Legal Reform in Croatia	38(5)	Politička	misao	87	





8	 	Tijana	Kojović	&	Dragan	Gajin, Vertical Restraints under Serbian Competition Law: A Comparison with EU 
Law,	33(8)	European	Competition	Law	Review	358	(2012).
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not only to horizontal cartels but also to vertical and combined horizontal-verti-
cal restrictive agreements.
Pursuant to the Competition Act9 and the Leniency Decree,10 a party to a 
restrictive agreement may be granted immunity from fines in the presence of 
the following nine cumulative conditions:
•	 the applicant is the first to report the agreement to the Commission;
•	 the Commission was not aware of the agreement, or was aware but did not 
have sufficient evidence to initiate proceedings;
•	 the applicant delivers to the Commission available evidence on the restric-
tive agreement, or points to the place where evidence is located or the person 
holding evidence;
•	 the applicant did not compel or incite other undertakings into the conclu-
sion or implementation of the restrictive agreement;
•	 the applicant was neither the initiator nor the organizer of the restrictive 
agreement;11
•	 the applicant signs a statement whereby it agrees that it will fully and 
continuously cooperate with the Commission in good faith, until the deci-
sion on the imposition of fine becomes final;
•	 the applicant must deliver all information in its possession or otherwise 
available to it, including documents and other evidence in connection with 
the reported agreement;
•	 the applicant must immediately cease its participation in the restrictive 
agreement, except based on the Commission’s approval, which may be 
granted for the purpose of the conduct of the proceedings and gathering 
evidence;12
•	 the applicant must undertake not to take actions which may endanger the 
conduct of the proceedings, in particular not to communicate information 
from the application to a third party without the Commission’s approval or 
destroy or conceal evidence.13
An undertaking which does not fulfil the conditions for immunity from fine 
may, upon its request, have its fine reduced if it:
•	 was neither the initiator nor the organizer of the restrictive agreement;
•	 did not compel or incite other parties to conclusion or implementation of the 
restrictive agreement;
•	 delivers to the Commission evidence which prior to that was not available 
to the Commission, and which enables the Commission to complete the 
9	 	Law	on	Protection	of	Competition	(Zakon o zaštiti konkurencije,	Službeni glasnik RS	51/2009).
10	 	Decree	on	the	conditions	for	release	from	liability	to	pay	the	pecuniary	amount	of	measure	of	protection	
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proceedings and render an infringement decision; and
•	 fully and continuously fulfils all other obligations of cooperation with the 
Commission.
According to the Leniency Guidelines,14 a party to the restrictive agreement 
wishing to acquire immunity from a fine may approach the Commission anony-
mously or by identifying itself.15 The party seeking immunity may turn to the 
Commission anonymously (e.g., via proxy), by delivering a notice with a short 
description of the content of the restrictive agreement, the list of evidence and 
information in its possession, and a short explanation of the content of evidence. 
The Commission will inform such party whether the restrictive agreement 
had already been reported, and/or whether the Commission already possesses 
sufficient evidence to initiate the proceedings.16 If the Commission is not aware 
of the existence of such agreement or does not possess sufficient evidence for 
the launch of the proceedings, it will refer the party to report the agreement 
and apply for immunity from fine.17 If, however, the Commission already has 
evidence sufficient for the launch of the proceedings, it will refer the applicant to 
the possibility of submitting a request for a reduction of the fine.18
Alternatively, the party may reveal its identity to the Commission by report-
ing the restrictive agreement and submitting an application for immunity from 
fine. The party can do so either by applying for a marker or by submitting a 
formal immunity application. A marker must include basic information on the 
content of the restrictive agreement, information on participants to the agree-
ment, a list of evidence in possession of the applicant, information on other 
evidence in possession of other participants or third parties, description of the 
content of evidence and an assessment on the time needed to submit a formal 
application for immunity.19 Upon receipt of the marker and review and assess-
ment of the allegations contained therein, the Commission will inform the 
applicant on its place in the queue for immunity and the deadline within which 
the marker needs to be perfected (this deadline cannot be longer than one 
month from the receipt of the marker).20 If the party submits a formal immu-
nity application within the prescribed deadline, the day of the submission of the 
14	 	Guidelines	for	the	application	of	Article	69	of	the	Law	on	Protection	of	Competition	and	the	Decree	on	
the	conditions	for	release	from	liability	to	pay	the	pecuniary	amount	of	measure	of	protection	of	compe-
tition	(Smernice za primenu člana 69. Zakona o zaštiti konkurencije i Uredbe o uslovima za oslobađanje 
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marker will be considered as the day of the submission of the formal application 
for immunity from the fine.21
Instead of applying for a marker, the applicant may submit a formal immu-
nity application from the outset. The content of such application is prescribed in 
the Guidelines.22 Upon receipt of a formal immunity application, the Commis-
sion examines, ‘within a reasonable time’, all allegations contained in the appli-
cation, analyses and assesses evidence supplied with the application, examines 
and assesses compliance with the requirements for immunity from fine, and, if 
needed, takes other actions (such as ordering the applicant to supplement/clar-
ify its application). Thereafter, the Commission informs the applicant in writing 
on whether the conditions for immunity from the fine are met.23 The Commis-
sion takes into account the order of the applications, and does not examine a 
later application until it has first decided on the earlier application.24
The party who applied for immunity from fines, but does not fulfil the condi-
tions for immunity from it, has two options. It may, within five working days 
from the receipt of the Commission’s notice informing it that it does not satisfy 
the conditions for complete immunity, withdraw evidence it submitted to the 
Commission.25 This does not prevent the Commission from requesting delivery 
of such evidence in the course of the investigation based on its powers from the 
Competition Act. Alternatively, the party, within the same deadline, may submit 
a request for its application to be considered as an application for reduction of 
fine (request for reclassification).26 In this case, the date of the initial applica-
tion for full immunity shall be considered as the date of the submission of the 
application for reduction of fine.27
In case the party neither withdraws evidence nor submits a request for 
reclassification, evidence may be used in the proceedings before the Commis-
sion.28
The party to the restrictive agreement may submit to the Commission an 
application for reduction of a fine at any time until the Commission issues its 
statement of objections.29 Upon receipt of the application, the Commission will, 
within a reasonable time, re-examine all allegations contained therein, analyse 
and assess evidence provided with the application, assess their probative value, 
examine and assess the fulfilment of all conditions for reduction of a fine to the 
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ing the applicant to supplement or clarify the content of its application.30 The 
Commission will then inform the applicant on its order of filing and whether 
the applicant meets the conditions for reduction of the fine.
The fine can be reduced in the following ranges:
•	 between 30% and 50%, if the applicant was the first among the parties to 
the agreement to apply for reduction of the fine;
•	 between 20% and 30%, if the applicant was the second among the parties to 
the agreement to apply for reduction of the fine;
•	 up to 20%, if the applicant was the third (fourth etc) among the parties to 
the agreement to apply for reduction of the fine.31
During the investigation initiated based on a leniency application, the Commis-
sion monitors the fulfilment of the conditions for immunity, or, as the case may 
be, reduction of the fine, and the fulfilment of the applicant’s obligations under 
the leniency program.32 If the Commission establishes that the applicant does 
not meet the requirements or is not fulfilling its obligations, it shall immedi-
ately inform the applicant thereof, and the party to the restrictive agreement, 
who is next in line, shall become eligible for immunity.33 Before concluding 
the proceedings, the Commission assesses the applicant’s compliance with 
the conditions and the obligations, cooperation with the Commission during 
the proceedings and the contribution made by the applicant to the successful, 
efficient and economical completion of the proceedings. Based on these assess-
ments, the Commission decides on immunity from fine and/or reduction of fine 
in the resolution in which it establishes the infringement.34
If the Commission’s decision establishing an infringement of competition is annulled by the court 
and remanded to the Commission, the party to the restrictive agreement, who secured immunity 
from fine or a reduction of fine, retains these privileges provided that it continues to fully meet the 
requirements of the leniency regime.35
 4 Dawn raids
In Serbia the Commission also has the power to perform dawn 
raids, or ‘unannounced inspections’, on the party’s or third party’s premises. 
The Commission can perform an unannounced inspection if there is a danger 
that evidence will be removed or altered.36 The persons occupying the premises 
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The first dawn raid in Serbia was conducted during July 2015 in Belgrade, 
related to the distribution of electric cigarettes. There was the suspicion that 
market players have agreed on the minimal price of these products in retail. 
According to the information of the Commission, affected parties were coopera-
tive with the authorities during the raids.37
 5 Data-conveyance
During an investigation, the Commission may request infor-
mation and documents from the investigated party(ies) as well as from third 
parties. This means that the Commission may request from the party relevant 
data, documents and items reasonably believed to be in its possession or 
which the party is obliged to possess.38 In case the party fails to comply with 
the request, the Commission may render a decision based on evidence on 
the record and make adverse inferences from the behavior of the recalcitrant 
party.39 If it has reasons to believe that required data, documents or items are in 
possession of a third party, the Commission may order delivery or inspection 
thereof.40 Unless the subject-matter of the request is privileged, the request is 
binding upon the third party.41 If the addressed person so requests, the Com-
mission may perform inspection and collection of data on the premises of the 
addressee.42
 6 Structure of the administrative competition procedure
In Serbia there are five phases of the administrative competi-
tion procedure:
•	 conclusion on initiation of proceedings
•	 conduct of investigation
•	 issuance of statement of objections
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It should be also mentioned, that Serbia has a unitary system, that is to say, 
the Commission is responsible for both conducting an investigation and making 
a decision in the proceedings.43
 7 Right of defense
Before issuing a decision in the proceedings initiated in order 
to investigate an alleged infringement of competition, the Commission shall 
inform the party of the relevant facts, evidence and other elements on which 
the Commission intends to base its decision.44 In essence, the statement of 
objections represents a draft of the Commission’s final decision and its delivery 
to the party allows the party to respond to the allegations.
In the statement of objections, the Commission has to set a deadline for a 
response. The actual deadline will depend on the circumstances of the case.45 
Although the law does not prescribe any minimum deadline for a response, 
in practice the Commission grants no less than fifteen days. Upon a reasoned 
request of the party, the Commission may extend the initially determined 
deadline for the response to the statement of objections, provided that there are 
justifiable reasons for the extension and that the request for the extension is 
submitted before the expiry of the initial deadline.46
There is no case-law dealing with self-incrimination.
All violations that find their way into the final decision must be addressed in 
the statement of objections, in order for the party to be able to exercise its right 
of defense.
 8 Establishing the facts and admissibility of evidence
In Serbia there is a so-called free evidencing system, that is to 
say, the NCA is not bound by rules when it comes to establishing the facts of 
the case. There are also no rules on evidence that is not admissible.
Regarding client-attorney communication directly relating to the proceed-
ings, it is treated as privileged communication47 and the rules on protected data 
apply accordingly.48 There is no case law on what constitutes communication 
directly related to the proceedings. However, the status of privileged communica-
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tion can be removed if it is suspected that this status has been abused.49 The law 
does not specify what can be considered as abuse in this context.
The issue of attorney-client privilege is further regulated by the legislation 
on the legal profession. Pursuant to of the Law on Attorneys, an attorney at law 
has the duty to keep information learned in the course of attorney-client rela-
tionship confidential.50 This duty is not limited in time.51
 9 Prescription of administrative liability
The statute of limitations for imposition of a fine is five years 
from the last action constituting the infringement.52 The statute of limitations 
is tolled every time the Commission takes an action towards establishing the 
infringement,53 subject to the absolute statute of limitations of ten years from 
the last action constituting the investigated infringement.54
The Competition Act lays down a separate five-year statute of limitations for 
the collection of a fine.55 In case the party challenges the Commission’s decision 
before the court, the five-year limitation period starts running from the date 
when the court decision on the challenge becomes final. Otherwise, the statute 
of limitations starts running from the date when the Commission’s decision 
becomes enforceable (i.e. from the date when the deadline for the payment of the 
fine set by the Commission expires56). This statute of limitations is tolled every 
time an action towards collection is undertaken, subject to the absolute ten-year 
statute of limitations.57
Before the 2013 amendments to the Competition Act, both imposition and 
collection of fines were subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which 
started running from the last infringement. No tolling was prescribed under 
the old legislation. The infringements investigated in the pending proceedings 
that were initiated prior to the entry into force of the 2013 amendments to the 
Competition Act remain subject to the shorter statute of limitations from the old 
legislation.58
49	 	Id.,	Art.	51	para.	3.
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The statute of limitations for both imposition and collection of procedural 
penalties is one year from the actionable breach.59 No tolling is possible.
 10 Judicial review
The Commission’s resolution can be challenged before the 
Administrative Court for error of law, error of fact, and breach of procedure.60 In 
practice, plaintiffs commonly invoke all three grounds for the challenge.
The general rule is that the Administrative Court decides based on the facts 
established in oral hearings.61 The court may decide without a hearing only if 
the parties agree thereto, or the subject-matter of the dispute does not require 
that the parties be heard and no special fact-finding is required.62 A decision 
of the court not to hold a hearing must be reasoned.63 In practice, however, the 
Administrative Court when acting in competition law cases holds hearings 
only exceptionally. When it is held, a hearing is, as a rule, open to the public.64 
The court may exclude publicity if this is required for the reasons of national 
security, public order, morals, protection of minors or protection of privacy of 
participants in the proceedings.65 The court’s decision on exclusion of publicity 
must be reasoned and published.66
If it finds against the Commission’s decision (in whole or in part), the 
Administrative Court may either remand the case to the Commission for recon-
sideration67 or decide the case on the merits.68 The latter can be done only when 
the established facts provide a reliable basis for the Administrative Court’s deci-
sion on the merits.69 So far, unless it upheld the Commission’s resolutions, the 
Administrative Court has, without exception, remanded them to the Commis-
sion.
An extraordinary appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court 
can be lodged to the Supreme Court of Cassation only for an error of law or for 
material breach of procedure (i.e. a procedural breach which could have affected 
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only.71 If it finds for the appellant, the Supreme Court of Cassation can either 
reverse or modify the Administrative Court’s decision.72 If it reverses the deci-
sion, the Supreme Court remands the matter to the Administrative Court for 
reconsideration with instructions which are binding upon the Administrative 
Court.73
Regarding trends of judicial review in Serbia, in the following we present 
some judgments of the Administrative Court, which show that the Court is 
ready to thoroughly analyze and inspect the reasoning of the Commission’s 
resolutions.
In the Sunoko case, the Serbian Commission for Protection of Competition 
prohibited Sunoko, the largest Serbian producer and exporter of sugar, from 
acquiring Hellenic Sugar, a Greek company which, among others, owned two 
sugar refineries in Serbia. The Administrative Court quashed the Commis-
sion’s resolution and remanded the case to the Commission for reconsideration. 
It quashed the Commission’s resolution not because it was of the view that the 
intended concentration should be allowed, but because of certain deficiencies in 
the proceedings before the Commission. According to the view of the Admin-
istrative Court, there were two main deficiencies concerning the Commission’s 
handling of Sunoko’s request for the approval of the concentration. First, the 
Court found that the meeting between representatives of the Commission and 
Sunoko, in which minutes were not kept but only an official note was made, 
cannot be considered as a proper opportunity for Sunoko to be heard. Second, 
according to the view of the Administrative Court, the Commission did not 
provide adequate reasoning for its decision to refuse the proposed measures for 
a conditional approval of the concentration. In that respect, the court invoked 
article 192 paragraph 1 of the Law on General Administrative Procedure, accord-
ing to which the competent body decides based on key facts established in the 
proceedings, and article 199, paragraph 2 of the Law on General Administra-
tive Procedure, which states that a decision must, inter alia, contain the reasons 
which, taking into account the established factual situation, support the holding 
of the decision. In its ruling, the court noted that the reasoning of the Commis-
sion’s decision prohibiting the concentration is not in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law on General Administrative Procedure, since the Commis-
sion in its reasoning only noted that the measures proposed by Sunoko were not 
suitable, without giving reasons for such a finding or stating which measures it 
would be ready to accept.
In another case, the parties, retail chain Idea and confectionary Swisslion, 
concluded a restrictive agreement. Both parties notified the disputed agree-
ment to the Commission and made leniency applications before the new Law on 
Protection of Competition entered into force. However, the Commission started 
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sions of this law. The Commission established that the agreement concluded 
was a prohibited restrictive agreement because it determined minimum retail 
prices, and fined Idea on the ground that it did not qualified for amnesty as 
the initiator of the restrictive agreement. Idea challenged the resolution of the 
Commission disputing the authority of the Commission to impose a fine on it, 
and also revoked the general constitutional prohibition of retroactive applica-
tion of laws. Actually, under the old Law the Commission did not have such 
authority. However, the Commission reasoned the application of the new Law 
with the fact that both laws provided that the proceedings before the Commis-
sion are deemed initiated by the enactment of the conclusion on the initiation of 
proceedings and not by the filing of a leniency application.74 The Court quashed 
the resolution for breach of procedure on the ground that the reasoning of the 
resolution was unsatisfactory. It reasoned that the Commission should have 
determined whether, based on the provisions of the Old Law, Idea acquired the 
right to be exempt from the fine by the very filing of the leniency application, 
even if such filing did not amount to the initiation of the proceedings. Besides, 
the Court found that the reasoning of the Commission’s resolution was inad-
equate in the part establishing the initiator of the agreement.75
In the Lasta/Europa Bus case, the Commission established that the bus 
pooling agreement between the two operators was a prohibited restrictive 
agreement because it established common tariffs on several intercity bus lines 
covered by the agreement, thus eliminating price competition. In the reasoning 
of the decision, the Commission also stated that the agreement facilitated the 
constant exchange of important business information, thus putting competitors 
in an unfavorable position. The Administrative Court annulled the Commis-
sion’s decision for breach of procedural rules, and pointed out the inconsistency 
between the holding and the reasoning of the resolution. According to the court, 
the Commission did not properly establish why it deemed the agreement to be 
restrictive. If the Commission found the agreement to be restrictive because it 
enabled the exchange of important business information, it should have spelled-
out the type of such information and how the exchange affected competition.76
74	 	Igor	Nikolić,	Tijana	Kojović,	Breach	of	procedure	as	the	basis	for	annulment	of	the	decisions	of	the	
Commission	for	Protection	of	Competition,	http://www.bdklegal.com/blogs/competition/competition-
law-other-issues/59-breach-of-procedure-as-the-basis-for-annulment-of-the-decisions-of-the-commis-
sion-for-protection-of-competition	(last	visited	August,	2,	2015).
75	 	Id.
76	 	Id.
